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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
________________ 
 
No. 17-1034 
________________ 
 
BERNARD T. CANETE, 
        Appellant 
 
v. 
  
BARNABAS HEALTH SYSTEM; NEWARK BETH ISRAEL MEDICAL CENTER; 
JOHN BRENNAN, CEO; ZACHARY LIPNER; JOANNE REILLY; MARY ELLEN 
WIGGINS; HELEN HARTNEY; JOHN DOES 1-10; JANE DOES 1-10; ABC 
CORPORATIONS A THROUGH Z 
     ________________ 
 
Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 2-12-cv-07222) 
District Judge: Honorable Esther Salas 
________________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
March 9, 2018 
 
Before: MCKEE, AMBRO, and RESTREPO, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: April 11, 2018) 
________________ 
 
OPINION* 
________________ 
 
AMBRO, Circuit Judge 
 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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Bernard Canete is a retired Army Lieutenant Colonel and a registered nurse 
employed in the Crisis Unit at the Newark Beth Israel Medical Center.  He brought suit in 
the District Court for the District of New Jersey against Defendants, his employers and 
supervisors, for impermissible discrimination on the basis of his age under the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1), and the New 
Jersey Law Against Discrimination (“NJLAD”), N.J. Stat. Ann. § 10:5-12(a); his race 
and national origin under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
2(a)(1), and the NJLAD, N.J. Stat. Ann. § 10:5-12(a); and his military status under the 
Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994 (“USERRA”), 
38 U.S.C. § 4311(a), and the NJLAD, N.J. Stat. Ann. § 10:5-12(a).  He also claims 
Defendants created a hostile work environment in violation of Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1), and the NJLAD, N.J. Stat. Ann. § 10:5-
12(a).  Finally, he claims Defendants aided and abetted each other in these discriminatory 
practices in violation of the NJLAD, N.J. Stat. Ann. § 10:5-12(e). 
Defendants moved for summary judgment.  For each of Canete’s discrimination 
claims to survive that motion, he must produce evidence of an adverse employment 
action taken against him.  See Storey v. Burns Int’l Sec. Servs., 390 F.3d 760, 761 (3d Cir. 
2004) (adverse employment action necessary for Title VII claims); Sarullo v. U.S. Postal 
Serv., 352 F.3d 789, 797 n.6 (3d Cir. 2003) (ADEA claim elements are “substantially the 
same” as Title VII claims, including the adverse employment action requirement); 
Carroll v. Del. River Port Auth., 843 F.3d 129, 131 (3d Cir. 2016) (adverse employment 
action necessary for USERRA claims); Battaglia v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 70 A.3d 
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602, 619 (N.J. 2013) (adverse employment action necessary for NJLAD claims).  
Similarly, for his hostile work environment claims, he must show evidence of 
discrimination “sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of [his] 
employment . . . .”  Spain v. Gallegos, 26 F.3d 439, 446 (3d Cir. 1994) (quoting Harris v. 
Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993)). 
The District Court granted Defendants’ motion because, among other things, 
Canete failed to establish an adverse action or severe or pervasive discriminatory 
conduct.  Canete now appeals that ruling.  He also argues that the District Court showed 
bias against him by misapplying the summary judgment standard.  We find no error in the 
District Court’s reasoning or application of the law and thus affirm.1 
An adverse employment action sufficient for Canete’s discrimination claims to 
proceed must be “serious and tangible enough to alter an employee’s compensation, 
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment . . . .”  Robinson v. City of Pittsburgh, 120 
F.3d 1286, 1300 (3d Cir. 1997); see also Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 562 U.S. 411, 416-17 
(2011) (describing USERRA’s discrimination prohibition as “very similar to Title VII”); 
ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (prohibiting discrimination with respect to employee’s 
“compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment”); NJLAD, N.J. Stat. 
Ann. § 10:5-12(a) (proscribing discrimination “in compensation or in terms, conditions or 
privileges of employment”).  Likewise, a hostile work environment must involve “severe 
                                              
1 The District Court exercised jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1367.  Our appellate 
jurisdiction is under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and our review of summary judgment 
determinations is plenary.  Jones v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 796 F.3d 323, 325 (3d Cir. 
2015). 
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or pervasive” harassment.  Castleberry v. STI Grp., 863 F.3d 259, 264 (3d Cir. 2017) 
(emphasis omitted); see also Carver v. City of Trenton, 420 F.3d 243, 262 (3d Cir. 2005) 
(noting NJLAD hostile work environment claims require “severe or pervasive” 
discriminatory conduct).  “[S]ome harassment may be severe enough to contaminate an 
environment even if not pervasive; other, less objectionable, conduct will contaminate the 
workplace only if it is pervasive.”  Castleberry, 863 F.3d at 264. (citation omitted). 
Canete claims that his employers and supervisors caused him to miss lunches and 
breaks and gave more favorable treatment to his co-workers, which he argues are adverse 
actions and created a hostile work environment.  However, the record fails to support 
these assertions.  At most, during the relevant timeframe:2 Canete missed only one lunch 
break; a co-worker once noted that Canete was the only employee who did not know how 
to use the office printer; he vaguely recalled some co-workers commenting that he should 
retire but could not describe specific instances; he was monitored and retrained following 
a supervisor’s concern about his technique for administering injections, but was subject 
to no further action; he was retrained after he did not follow the correct protocol for 
physically restraining a patient, but was subject to no further action; and once, when he 
answered a phone call with “Colonel Canete,” the junior co-worker on the other line 
giggled for unknown reasons. 
                                              
2 Pursuant to a District Court Order that is unchallenged here, Canete’s claims may be 
based only on events that occurred after June 13, 2012.  See Order at 2, Canete v. 
Barnabus Health Sys., No. 2:12-cv-07222 (D.N.J. Sept. 18, 2013). 
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Even viewing these assertions in the light most favorable to Canete, see Carvalho-
Grevious v. Del. State Univ., 851 F.3d 249, 256 (3d Cir. 2017), they do not raise a 
genuine question as to whether he suffered a serious, tangible change in employment 
status or whether Defendants intentionally discriminated against him in a severe or 
pervasive manner.  Because his underlying discrimination and hostile work environment 
claims fail, Canete’s aiding and abetting claims must also.  See Tarr v. Ciasulli, 853 A.2d 
921, 929 (N.J. 2004). 
Lastly, Canete’s argument that the District Court revealed a judicial bias against 
him by misapplying the summary judgment standard has no merit, as the record reflects 
that the Court carefully addressed each of his claims and properly applied the relevant 
law. 
We therefore affirm. 
